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INTERPRETING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Alexander Tsesis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Emerging from the Civil War in 1865, the Reconstruction Con-
gress proposed numerous reform statutes pursuant to its power un-
der the newly ratified Thirteenth Amendment.1  The Enforcement 
Clause, found in the second section of the Amendment, granted leg-
islators unprecedented power to pass nationally-binding civil rights 
legislation.2 
As complicated as ending slavery had been, an even more daunt-
ing task loomed of ending all its incidental tyrannies.  Not only was 
slavery a form of labor exploitation, it also infringed on individuals’ 
rights to choose spouses, travel, and make parental decisions.3  These 
and other forms of subordination were not merely local.  The institu-
tion had spread through the channels of interstate commerce, private 
 
 * Loyola University School of Law, Chicago.  I’m grateful to John Nowak, David Brion Da-
vis, and Mike Zubrensky for their advice. 
 1 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 589 (1865) (documenting Congress’s discus-
sion of African American citizens petitioning Congress for the right to vote); S. 427, 38th 
Cong. (1865), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsb&fileName=
038/llsb038.db&recNum=1719 (prohibiting the exclusion of persons from travel upon 
any railroad or navigable water in the United States on the basis of race, implicitly relying 
on the Thirteenth Amendment power). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1–2(“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. . . . Congress shall have power 
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
 3 Following the Civil War, leading advocates of the Thirteenth Amendment explained how 
slavery degraded the white and black laborers: 
  I tell you, sir, that the man who is the enemy of the black laboring man is the enemy 
of the white laboring man the world over.  The same influences that go to keep down 
and crush down the rights of the poor black man bear down and oppress the poor 
white laboring man. 
  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866).  Representative George Julian, another 
advocate of free labor and abolition, compared business exploitation with enslavement:  
“The rights of men are sacred, whether trampled down by Southern slave-drivers, the 
monopolists of the soil, the grinding power of corporate wealth, the legalized robbery of 
a protective tariff, or the power of concentrated capital in alliance with labor-saving ma-
chinery.”  GEORGE W. JULIAN, POLITICAL RECOLLECTIONS:  1840 TO 1872, 322–23 (Negro 
Univ. Press 1970) (1884). 
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transactions, and sectional compromises.  The Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s First Section obliged States and individuals to immediately 
free slaves.  The Second Section, with its grant of legislative authority, 
had long-term implications for the use of federal power. 
Despite these great expectations, narrow judicial interpretations 
during the nineteenth century, in decisions like the Slaughter-House 
Cases4 and the Civil Rights Cases,5 undercut the Amendment’s effec-
tiveness.  Only at the tail end of the 1960s did the Supreme Court re-
vise its interpretation.  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, the most expositive 
Supreme Court case on the Amendment, determined that the 
Amendment authorized Congress to act against a broad range of in-
justices that are rationally related to the badges and incidents of in-
voluntary servitude.6  The Thirteenth Amendment nevertheless re-
mained primarily relegated to the annals of history, with few 
legislative uses to expand its reach. 
Most civil rights statutes, from the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, have relied on 
the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause.  Recent Su-
preme Court decisions, however, have limited Congress’s ability to re-
ly on those two sources for authority,7 increasing a need to analyze 
the extent to which the Thirteenth Amendment provides a viable al-
ternative for pursuing civil rights strategies. 
This essay first examines how Gilded Age Supreme Court cases 
hamstrung legislative initiatives.  It then turns to the Warren and 
Burger Courts’ understanding of the Amendment.  Relying on those 
precedents, I analyze the Thirteenth Amendment’s contemporary 
significance. 
I.  SUPREME COURT REACTION 
Early Supreme Court interpretations of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment narrowed its scope.  In a series of opinions, the Court rendered 
the Amendment virtually unrecognizable to the participants of the 
congressional debates that preceded its ratification. 
 
 4 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
 5 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 6 392 U.S. 409, 440–41 (1968) (“Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and 
the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.  Nor can we say 
that the determination Congress has made is an irrational one.”). 
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–19 (2000) (diminishing Congress’s 
ability to rely on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
558–59 (1995) (reducing Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
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During those debates, many congressmen described the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s potential for ending any forms of oppression 
associated with slavery, not merely the exploitation of forced labor.  
Radical Republicans’ statements on the subject were the most vision-
ary, but moderates also indicated that they concurred about the 
Amendment’s potential to alter antebellum federalism. 
Representative John F. Farnsworth of Illinois agued that one facet 
of liberty was familial autonomy.  He asserted that a “man’s right to 
himself, to his wife and children” was inalienable.8  With the end of 
slavery, individuals’ right to choose a spouse and to raise and educate 
their children had to be secured against state and private interfer-
ence.9 
Illinois Representative Ebon C. Ingersoll also held an expansive 
view of the Thirteenth Amendment’s potential uses.  He asserted that 
living in a state of freedom meant profiting from one’s labor and en-
joying marital happiness without the fear of being sold away from 
family members.10  Senator James Harlan of Iowa expressed an even 
wider-reaching definition of liberty.  He believed the Amendment 
would end the “incidents of slavery,” which included interference 
with family life, discriminatory jury selection, and barriers to property 
ownership.11 
Shortly after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, Speaker 
of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, Schuyler Colfax, stressed Congress’s 
newfound powers: 
[I]t is yours to mature and enact legislation which . . . shall establish 
[state governments] anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will gua-
ranty all necessary safeguards to the people, and afford, what our Magna 
Charta, the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the chief object of 
government—protection to all men in their inalienable rights.12 
The notion that the Thirteenth Amendment meant to do no more 
than free slaves was a revisionist concept spread by opponents of re-
construction.  Shortly after the Amendment’s ratification, as Con-
gress debated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Representative M. Russell 
 
 8 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1865). 
 9 While no one, from either house of Congress, advocated to legalize intermarriage, the 
seed of that reform had been sown through abolitionist-minded congressmen.  See Hamil-
ton, The Marriage Bill, LIBERATOR, June 11, 1831, at 1 (discussing the potential effects of 
repealing a Massachusetts law forbidding intermarriage). 
 10 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864) (describing each man’s inalienable right 
to live in a state of freedom, till the soil, enjoy the rewards of his own labor, and enjoy his 
family without fear of infringement). 
 11 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439–40 (1864). 
 12 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1865). 
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Thayer mocked the notion that the Amendment had merely secured 
“the freedom from sale or barter.”  To the contrary, constitutional 
abolition would allow freed persons to enjoy “those great natural 
rights to which every man is entitled by nature.”13 
Ingersoll also expected that the Amendment would provide lever-
age not only to improve the status of blacks but “poor white people” 
as well.14  The Republican Party had been founded, and during Re-
construction continued to press, for free labor rights.15 
The Supreme Court soon restrained Congress from passing legis-
lation that might have achieved these and other progressive goals.  
The pattern was set early in the Slaughter-House Cases.16  The case in-
volved a challenge to a state-created monopoly, which the Court held 
to be a constitutional public health regulation.  The decision is best 
known for its spurious distinguishment between the privileges and 
immunities of state and United States citizenship.17  An often over-
looked portion of the decision also diminished the scope of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel F. Miller discounted the 
petitioners’ argument that monopolistic practices violated their right 
to choose a vocation.18  He regarded the Thirteenth Amendment in 
the context of forced labor, which was not strictly confined to black 
slavery.  Slaughter-House dictum indicated that the Amendment also 
applies to “Mexican peonage and the Chinese coolie labor system.”19 
Justice Field, one of the four dissenting justices, agreed that “involun-
tary servitude” referred to forms of vassalage like peonage.  But the 
abolition of slavery, he wrote, also secured the “right to pursue the 
ordinary avocations of life,” which a state monopoly impeded.20 
The Court’s retrenchment away from national anti-discrimination 
standards into parochial racial norms appeared in the 1883 Civil 
Rights Cases.21  The decision auspiciously found that the Thirteenth 
 
 13 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866). 
 14 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864). 
 15 ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:  THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 38–41 (1st ed. 1970). 
 16 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 66–83 (1872). 
 17 Id. at 78–79 (“Having shown that the privileges and immunities relied on in the argument 
are those which belong to citizens of the States as such, and that they are left to the State 
governments for security and protection, and not by this article placed under the special 
care of the Federal government, we may hold ourselves excused from defining the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States which no State can abridge . . . .”). 
 18 Id. at 66–74. 
 19 Id. at 72. 
 20 Id. at 90 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 21 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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Amendment did not grant Congress authority to prohibit discrimina-
tion in public places of accommodation.  That outcome heralded ju-
dicial countenance of Jim Crow laws that persisted until 1954.22 
The Civil Rights Cases struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on 
the basis of both the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments.  The 
majority’s analytic distinction between the two has important conse-
quences to contemporary cases, such as United States v. Morrison, 
which continue to rely on the Civil Rights Cases.23 
Writing for the majority, Justice Joseph P. Bradley announced that 
the Fourteenth Amendment had a state action component.24  While 
Bradley ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was an overextension 
of legislative authority, he created precedent for future expansion of 
federal power.  Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court 
concluded, granted Congress authority to pass all laws “necessary and 
proper . . . for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its 
badges and incidents.”25  Among the “necessary incidents” of slavery 
and involuntary servitude Bradley included prohibitions against black 
court testimony and property ownership.26 
Despite this recognition, the Court rejected the claim that under 
the Thirteenth Amendment Congress could penalize segregated 
businesses, even ones that provided public services.27  Bradley went 
beyond the narrow issues in the case, asserting that the Thirteenth 
Amendment “simply abolished slavery” while the Fourteenth 
Amendment “prohibited the states from abridging the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.”28  The majority of eight 
did not regard discrimination perpetrated by opera houses and inns 
to be incidental to slavery.  This conclusion allowed for the un-
 
 22 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of children in pub-
lic schools based solely on race denies equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 23 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602, 621, 624 (2000) (striking down 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981 because the statute’s civil remedy exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority). 
 24 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11, 19 (“It is State action of a particular character that is 
prohibited.  Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the 
amendment.  It has a deeper and broader scope. . . . This is not corrective legislation; it is 
primary and direct; it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right 
of admission to inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement.  It supersedes and 
displaces State legislation on the same subject, or only allows it permissive force.”). 
 25 Id. at 20–21. 
 26 Id. at 22. 
 27 Id. at 24. 
 28 Id. at 23. 
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checked development of public Jim Crow facilities during the late 
1880s and early 1890s.29 
Only the first Justice Harlan dissented in the case.  He found the 
majority’s interpretation of the incidents of slavery to be “narrow and 
artificial” and contrary to the “substance and spirit” of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.30  Segregation, he argued, perpetuated a system of black 
subservience, while the Thirteenth Amendment secured the com-
plete “freedom [that] necessarily involved immunity from, and pro-
tection against, all discrimination against them, because of their race, 
in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races.”31  
According to him, then, abolition was only the beginning of complete 
emancipation from supremacist institutions.  The Amendment’s 
practical effect was to provide Congress with the “express power to 
enforce that amendment, by appropriate legislation.”  Anti-
discrimination laws were needed, 
to protect that people against the deprivation, because of their race, of any 
civil rights granted to other freemen in the same State; and such legisla-
tion may be of a direct and primary character, operating upon States, 
their officers and agents, and, also, upon, at least, such individuals and 
corporations as exercise public functions and wield power and authority 
under the State.32 
Harlan thought the majority to be mistaken that public accommoda-
tions were places of private, social interaction; to the contrary, their 
use was essential to participation in civic life. 
The Supreme Court did not end its assault on the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s substance in the Civil Rights Cases.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 
another odious case, also regarded segregation to be a social rather 
than public matter.33  The Court rejected the claim that forced racial 
separation on railcars marked African Americans with a badge of in-
feriority.34  The first Justice Harlan’s dissent, on the other hand, rec-
ognized that sharing public rail was an aspect of civic freedom.35  He 
foresaw that the holding of the case would legitimize other forms of 
segregation.36 
 
 29 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 13–95 (rev. ed. 1957). 
 30 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 31 Id. at 36. 
 32 Id. 
 33 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (supporting the notion of “separate but equal”). 
 34 Id. at 551. 
 35 Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statute segregating railroad cars on the 
basis of race interferes with personal freedom). 
 36 Id. (“If a State can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not 
travel as passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the 
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After Reconstruction, the Thirteenth Amendment remained ef-
fective only for ending peonage.37  Only in 1968, at the very end of 
the Civil Rights Era, did the Court expand the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s reach.  In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court found that a 
private law suit, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 seeking to prevent 
housing discrimination, could be brought pursuant to a statute pre-
dicated on Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority.38  The 
Court also formulated a general rule for civil rights enforcement:  
“Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment 
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slav-
ery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective 
legislation.”39 
The Burger Court went a step further.  It upheld Congress’s au-
thority to prevent private school segregation, pursuant to Section 2 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment.40  In Runyon v. McCrary, the Court rea-
soned that civil remedies were available to secure for “[a]ll persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States” the same rights “to make 
and enforce contracts.”41  Interestingly, plaintiff parents’ contractual 
right to be free from the incidents of involuntary servitude trumped 
the free association right of those parents who wanted schools to re-
main segregated.42 
Another decision from the 1970s, Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recrea-
tion Association, provided further insight into individual liberties cov-
ered under the Amendment.  Parties brought the case against a local 
swimming club’s racially-exclusionary membership.  And the Court 
found that racially discriminatory policies violated §§ 1981 and 1982 
liberty protections.43 
 
streets of its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on one side of a street 
and black citizens to keep on the other?”). 
 37 Anti-Peonage Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546, 546 (1867) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1994 (2000)).  A landmark case defined peonage “as a status or condition of compulsory 
service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master.  The basal fact is indebt-
edness.”  Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); see also Pollock v. Williams, 322 
U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (“The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented 
by the Antipeonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of com-
pletely free and voluntary labor . . . .”); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146, 148–
50 (1914) (distinguishing between free and voluntary labor); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 
219, 245 (1911) (striking down state law to the extent it made refusal to work evidence of 
a crime). 
 38 392 U.S. 409, 438–39 (1968). 
 39 Id. at 440. 
 40 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168–75 (1976). 
 41 Id. at 164 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
 42 Id. at 175–77. 
 43 410 U.S. 431, 435−40 (1973). 
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The Court has also determined that an employee can bring a 
§ 1981 claim against a private employer.  Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency pointed out that sometimes a § 1981 complaint has advantages 
over a Title VII charge filed through the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (“EEOC”).44  Section 1981 provides a longer time 
frame for filing a claim than Title VII.45  Further, § 1981 does not re-
quire litigants to exhaust the administrative process, as does Title VII, 
and § 1981 applies to a more inclusive group of employer-
defendants.46  Section 1981 applies to discrimination at the time of 
the employment contract formation and, as the Court pointed out in 
a 2008 case, to employers’ retaliatory acts perpetrated thereafter.47 
Since 1968, all Supreme Court cases dealing with §§ 1981 and 
1982 have deferred to Congress’s civil rights authority under Section 
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.  Meanwhile, Congress has rarely 
tried to invoke that power to pass laws with a broader applicability 
than contract and property rights.  Even in the context of only those 
two interests, the Court has recognized that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment enables Congress to prevent housing discrimination and private 
school segregation, neither of which is directly tied to slavery as a 
form of labor exploitation.  The scope of the Amendment, therefore, 
encompasses liberty interests far beyond receiving reasonable com-
pensation for work. 
The expansion of Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence began in 
a liberal court and continued through a moderately conservative one.  
The implication of this line of cases is that Congress can go still fur-
 
 44 421 U.S. 454, 459–61 (1975). 
 45 Title VII ordinarily requires an aggrieved party to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 
days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or 300 days after the unlawful practice 
if the aggrieved party files a discrimination complaint in a state or local agency.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–5(e) (2000).  Filing a Title VII action with the EEOC does not toll the statute of 
limitations on § 1981 claims.  Johnson, 421 U.S. at 465−66.  For a discussion of the appli-
cable statutes of limitation for § 1981 complaints, see Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 
541 U.S. 369, 371, 380–83 (2004); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 
(1987). 
 46 Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304 n.3 (1994) (“Even in the employment 
context, § 1981’s coverage is broader than Title VII’s, for Title VII applies only to em-
ployers with 15 or more employees, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), whereas § 1981 has no such 
limitation.”).  Justice Brennan, in a concurring and dissenting opinion to Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union (Patterson II), wrote that “§ 1981 is not limited in scope to employ-
ment discrimination by businesses with 15 or more employees, cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), 
and hence may reach the nearly 15% of the workforce not covered by Title VII.”  491 U.S. 
164, 211 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  A disadvantage 
of § 1981 is that, unlike Title VII, it does not provide for attorneys’ fees.  Johnson, 421 U.S. 
at 460. 
 47 CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1956–58 (2008). 
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ther in protecting fundamental rights by passing laws pursuant to its 
Section 2 power.  Courts can review the constitutionality of such laws 
by assessing whether they are legitimate means for ending discrimina-
tion that Congress found to be rationally related to the incidents of 
involuntary servitude.  That formula is analogous to the rational basis 
standard of review which the Court until recently relied on to evalu-
ate Commerce Clause cases.48 
II.  THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TODAY 
Congress has traditionally relied on its Commerce Clause author-
ity to pass statutes affecting individual rights.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment has likewise provided a foundation for protecting the 
general welfare, especially through judicial identification of funda-
mental rights.  The Supreme Court has recently diminished the abil-
ity of the federal government to use these two constitutional provi-
sions to pass civil rights legislation.  Given this regressive 
development, legislators searching for an alternative source of au-
thority should explore the reach of Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
A.  The Evolving Commerce Clause 
In several cases upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Court recognized Congress’s power to end various 
forms of discrimination pursuant to the Commerce Clause.49  Title II 
of the Act penalized discrimination perpetrated at places of public 
accommodation, which the Supreme Court had previously found to 
be outside the scope of the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments.  
Rather than overturning this nineteenth century decision, the Court 
upheld the 1964 law on the basis of Congress’s Commerce Clause au-
thority. 
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court 
announced that Congress could use its power over interstate com-
 
 48 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality:  The Neglected Citizenship Clause 
and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 285 (2000) (noting that the Court, un-
til recently, broadly interpreted the scope of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate 
commerce); Frank D’Angelo, Note, Turf Wars:  Street Gangs and the Outer Limits of RICO’s 
“Affecting Commerce” Requirement, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2087–89 (2008) (explaining 
the deferential approach of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence prior to the late 
1990s). 
 49 Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in various sections of 28 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
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merce to prevent a private business, a downtown motel in that case, 
from discriminating against clients on the basis of race, color, relig-
ion, or national origin.50  While the motel operated in a single state, 
its advertisement efforts were national, and it let rooms out to inter-
state travelers.51  The motel claimed that by forcing it to rent accom-
modations to racially undesired customers Congress had subjected it 
to involuntary servitude.52  But the Court found this argument to be 
spurious, recognizing that the Thirteenth Amendment was not meant 
to further discrimination but to end it.53 
In a companion case, Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court also found 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be applicable to a local restaurant that 
purchased out-of-state products from an in-state supplier.54  The own-
er’s effort to enjoin prosecution, in part, by raising a Thirteenth 
Amendment defense was unsuccessful.  On writ of certiorari, the Su-
preme Court refused to weigh in on the Thirteenth Amendment is-
sue.  Instead, the Court denied the request for an injunction because 
it found the restaurant’s segregationist practices to interfere with in-
terstate interests associated with business travel.55 
Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung established the principle that 
Congress can pass any necessary and proper law that is rationally re-
lated to interstate commerce.  As long as Congress had engaged in a 
minimum threshold of factfinding, the Court did not second-guess 
legislative policies.56  Despite this doctrine’s long pedigree, which is 
based on New Deal jurisprudence, during the late 1990s the Court 
began to diminish congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause.  This new line of cases has elevated the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s relevancy to civil rights litigation. 
The Court’s reinterpretation of congressional Commerce Clause 
authority began with United States v. Lopez.57  In ruling that the Gun-
 
 50 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 51 Id. at 243. 
 52 Id. at 244. 
 53 Id. at 244, 261. 
 54 379 U.S. 294, 296–97 (1964). 
 55 Id. at 303–05. 
 56 Archibald Cox, Foreword:  Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 91, 105 (1966) (“The Court does not review the sufficiency of the evidence 
in the record to support congressional action. . . . No case has ever held that a record is 
constitutionally required.”); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency:  The Propriety 
of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 732–33 (1996) (stating that 
requiring all laws with constitutional implication to be supported by extensive legislative 
findings “unquestionably would fundamentally alter the relationship between the judici-
ary and the legislature”). 
 57 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional, the Court created a new 
evaluative approach.  Rather than relying on the deferential rational 
basis test, as it had done since Heart of Atlanta Motel, Chief Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist for the majority examined whether the statute 
concerned conduct with a “substantial effect” on interstate com-
merce.58  The Court found that the legislative record did not contain 
enough information about guns near schools to meet that analytical 
standard.59  What is more, the Court made clear that only statutes tar-
geting an “economic enterprise” would fall within Commerce Clause 
authority.60 
In dissent, Justice Breyer took the Court to task for deviating from 
the rational basis test. He emphasized that weapons carried near 
schools could have a cumulatively significant effect on interstate 
commerce.61 
The Court’s increasingly economic reading of the Commerce 
Clause also made its mark in United States v. Morrison.  The case struck 
the private cause of action provision from the Violence Against 
Women Act (“VAWA”).62  That statute was a bipartisan effort that re-
lied on findings that lawmakers amassed through nine congressional 
hearings and twenty-one state task forces.  The consensus among 
Democrats and Republicans was that the “mountain of data” they had 
collected showed that gender violence had a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce.63  By rejecting this massive evidence, the Court 
further diminished Congress’s ability to pass civil rights legislation.  
The Court rejected conclusions drawn from the gathered data be-
cause gender motivated crimes “are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity.”64 
The dissent again opposed abandoning the rational basis of 
Commerce Clause review.65  In his dissent, Justice Souter expressed 
his conviction that Congress’s hearings about interstate impact that 
led to the enactment of VAWA were even more thorough than those 
 
 58 Id. at 561–63. 
 59 Id. at 561–65. 
 60 Id. at 558–61. 
 61 Id. at 616, 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 62 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). 
 63 Id. at 628–31 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 64 Id. at 613 (majority opinion). 
 65 Id. at 637–38, 647–52 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I 
continue to agree with Justice Souter that the Court’s traditional ‘rational basis’ approach 
is sufficient.”). 
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on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.66  As with the 1964 statute, which re-
lied on testimony of the “highly restrictive effect” of discrimination 
“upon interstate travel,”67 VAWA passed after Congress had docu-
mented that gender violence impeded “the mobility of employees 
and their production and consumption of goods shipped in interstate 
commerce.”68 
Unlike its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
has never restricted the Thirteenth Amendment to economic mat-
ters.  Neither is it likely to do so.  Further, even one infringement on 
an individual’s rights would be actionable; whereas, Morrison asserts 
that a single harm to the national economy would not be enough for 
Commerce Clause purposes.69 
The recent Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that using 
the Commerce Clause to set civil rights policy is vulnerable to eco-
nomic counterarguments.  Judges with a states’ rights leaning are 
likely to require a high burden of proof about the magnitude of in-
terstate commerce involvement rather than relying on congressional 
findings.  In the case of violence against women, years of documenta-
tion proved to be insufficiently persuasive.  If a new version of VAWA 
were to rely on Thirteenth Amendment analysis, on the other hand, 
proving that violence against even one woman related to the subor-
dination of involuntary servitude would suffice to secure a conviction. 
Whether such physical harm is an incident of involuntary servi-
tude is a question that, according to Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., only 
Congress can answer; and a judge can review under a rational basis 
standard.70  Whether a woman suffered economic harm is irrelevant 
for Thirteenth Amendment assessment.  What is pertinent is that vio-
lence was regularly perpetrated against women on plantations.  An-
drew Koppelman, among other scholars, has pointed out that sexual 
crimes were endemic to slavery.71  Therefore, given congressional task 
forces who found that state courts do not provide adequate proce-
 
 66 Id. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that sexual assault and domestic violence caused 
a loss of $3 billion in 1990 and $5 to $10 billion in 1993). 
 67 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964). 
 68 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 634, 636 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 69 See id. at 617–18 (majority opinion) (rejecting “the argument that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect 
on interstate commerce”). 
 70 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 71 Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor:  A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. 
REV. 480, 508–09 (1990). 
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dural protections for the victims of sexual abuse,72 Congress can rely 
on its Thirteenth Amendment power to create a needed federal rem-
edy. 
Given the sparseness of Thirteenth Amendment precedents, 
broadening its reach is more likely to succeed through incremental 
policymaking.  This step-by-step strategy is analogous to the NAACP’s 
successful approach to litigation in the Fourteenth Amendment 
area.73  A modest place to start is a statute tying forced labor to a rela-
tively narrow group of domestic violence cases involving restraints on 
employment.  An analogy to involuntary servitude can be drawn 
where a husband uses physical force or violence to keep his wife from 
working.  Prosecutors could then show that a husband who used 
force to prevent his wife from obtaining work outside the home acted 
in a way that was reminiscent of slave-holders’ treatment of human 
chattel.  This narrow federal question cause of action would open ad-
ditional opportunities for expanding the role of Thirteenth Amend-
ment decision-making. 
The Thirteenth Amendment approach to the problem is 
grounded in human rights purposes.  It differs from the Commerce 
Clause strategy to civil rights policymaking, which can only clear the 
judicially set hurdle by showing that a statute regulates activity that 
has a substantial effect on the national economy.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment was the first constitutional change of the Second Found-
ing.  It required the nation to live up to the ideals first announced in 
the Declaration of Independence and reiterated in the Preamble.74  
Unlike the Amendment, the Commerce Clause is a neutral device.  
Congress might have regulated the interstate flow of slaves after 1824 
when the Court decided Gibbons v. Ogden,75 but, until the ratification 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, national power over commerce was 
never used to stem the sale and transport of slaves.76 
 
 72 S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 49–50 (1993) (noting that “State remedies have proven inade-
quate to protect women against violent crimes motivated by gender animus”). 
 73 See Mark Tushnet, The Rights Revolution in the Twentieth Century, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 377, 381 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 
2008). 
 74 ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM:  A LEGAL 
HISTORY 108–09 (2004). 
 75 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1824) (holding that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress 
to regulate interstate navigation). 
 76 See Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation:  A 
Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 107, 123 (1998)(“[T]he non-use of these 
powers . . . owed more to the bad faith of the American people than to any inherent con-
stitutional restraints.”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson,  A Critique of the Narrow 
Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 702 n.54 (2002) (describing 
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Turning to the Thirteenth Amendment for a fresh legislative 
strategy is not, however, meant to displace the Commerce Clause.  
Many laws passed pursuant to this grant of power, including the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and various provisions of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, need no buttressing.  But in the area of gender moti-
vated violence or other forms of hate crimes, the Thirteenth 
Amendment offers a new lawmaking strategy to avoid running afoul 
of United States v. Morrison.77 
Senator Edward Kennedy recently introduced the Matthew She-
pard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007.78  
He rooted the congressional authority for that hate crime bill in Sec-
tion 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.  While he eventually withdrew 
the bill, it provided a look at the Amendment’s continued relevance 
to contemporary policy.  The proposal related that: 
For generations, the institutions of slavery and involuntary servitude were 
defined by the race, color, and ancestry of those held in bondage.  Slav-
ery and involuntary servitude were enforced, both prior to and after the 
adoption of the 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, through widespread public and private violence directed at per-
sons because of their race, color, or ancestry, or perceived race, color, or 
ancestry.  Accordingly, eliminating racially motivated violence is an im-
portant means of eliminating, to the extent possible, the badges, inci-
dents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude.79 
During the same session of Congress, Representative John Conyers 
also introduced a hate crimes prevention act but based it on Con-
gress’s power over interstate commerce.80 
Given the Court’s new Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which 
emerged in United States v. Lopez, it is more likely that Kennedy’s, ra-
ther than Conyers’s, version of the bill would survive judicial scrutiny.  
An approach that is even more likely to withstand appellate review 
should include both Thirteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause 
 
Professor Barnett’s contention that Congress could enact regulations concerning foreign 
commerce such as slave importation). 
 77 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 78 Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 
110th Cong. (2007).  In the interest of full disclosure, it is important to mention that I 
advised Senator Kennedy’s judicial committee staff on the drafting of this bill.  For a 
compassionate description of Shepard’s murder, see Shannon Gilreath, “Tell Your Faggot 
Friend He Owes Me $500 for My Broken Hand”:  Thoughts on Substantive Equality Theory of Free 
Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming) (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper 
No. 1332040), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1332040. 
 79 Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 
110th Cong. (2007). 
 80 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
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justifications for a nationally enforceable hate crimes law.  An added 
severability clause would enable the law to survive even if a court de-
clared one of those two grounds to be an invalid use of congressional 
power. 
Beyond simply pragmatic reasons for relying on the Amendment 
to pass new civil rights legislation, it would add a communicative di-
mension to such law that the Commerce Clause does not provide.  At 
the time of its ratification, the Thirteenth Amendment revealed a 
break from antebellum constitutionalism.  It put federal muscle be-
hind abolishing slavery.  Within a year, Congress relied on it to pass 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.81  This demonstrated a commitment to 
battle the incidents of involuntary servitude rather than remaining 
complacent with liberating slaves.  Yet the ambitious plans of reap-
portioning Confederate leaders’ lands to newly freed slaves failed to 
get enough support.82 
Today, despite the enormous progress that made it possible for an 
African American to become president, much remains undone.  
Human trafficking exploits labor in a way that transcends simple 
economic and racial rubrics.  Likewise, abuses against migrant farm-
ers, foreign workers, child apprentices, and domestic laborers all in-
volve economic harms, but they each require redress that is based on 
the nation’s commitment to civil rights rather than solely the regula-
tion of the channels of the interstate exchange.83 
Tying anti-discrimination legislation to a civil rights amendment 
relays an important message about the value of individual liberty.  A 
 
 81 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27–30 (1866) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 242 (2006) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (2000)). 
 82 Thaddeus Stevens proposed to give freed persons “forty acres and a mule.”  William A. 
Russ, Jr., The Negro and White Disfranchisement During Radical Reconstruction, 19 J. OF NEGRO 
HIST. 171, 184 (1934).  Another radical Congressman, George W. Julian, also proposed a 
land reapportionment scheme of reparation.  WILLIAM RICHTER, AMERICAN 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1862–1877, at 240–41 (1996). 
 83 For a variety of cases dealing with the exploitation of labor rising to the level of involun-
tary servitude, see Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1294 (N.D. Okla. 
2006); Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 (N.D. Okla. 2004); Wei-
denfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 449–51 (E.D. Wis. 1974).  The purposes of criminal-
izing human trafficking are explained in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 7101(b)(12) (2000) (describing the impact of trafficking for such purposes as “involun-
tary servitude, peonage, and other forms of forced labor”).  See also Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Note, Men Who Own Women:  A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 YALE 
L.J. 791, 806–09 (1993) (“Pimps deprive prostitutes of their free will and their free labor 
in the same way that Southern slave masters deprived slaves in the 1800’s.”)  On the use 
of the Thirteenth Amendment to punish the forceful use of migrant farm labor, see 
United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 833 (11th Cir. 1985); United States. v. Booker, 655 
F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981).  On the forceful use of child labor, see United States v. King, 
840 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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law that directly targets the vestiges of subordination sends a signal 
about the nation’s values.  Stressing the federal government’s com-
mitment to protect individuals against the continued incidents of in-
voluntary servitude is more likely to alter classist, racist, and sexist hi-
erarchies than laws grounded on utility maximization. 
The Thirteenth Amendment is a more logical source of federal 
civil rights authority than the Commerce Clause.  It can help fill the 
gap of federal authority that the Supreme Court created in United 
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison.  The Amendment empow-
ers government to prohibit private and public breaches against per-
sonal autonomy, even when violators do not substantially impact the 
national economy.  On the other hand, recent Supreme Court deci-
sions increasingly interlink the Commerce Clause to large-scale eco-
nomic transactions.  Reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment’s En-
forcement Clause has become of further import because of the 
Court’s new interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B.  The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
The Fourteenth Amendment, just as the Thirteenth Amendment, 
demonstrates the country’s commitment to individual rights.  The lat-
ter was the first constitutional break from the slave-protecting provi-
sions of the original Constitution.  Besides abolishing slavery, it pro-
vided Congress with the necessary authority to pass laws preventing 
state or private infringement against universal liberties.  Shortly the-
reafter, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated due process and 
equal protection into the constitutional ethos.  It, too, augmented 
legislative power, which the Court restricted in the Civil Rights Cases 
to the regulation of state actions.  In the past decade, the Court has 
added new restraints on Fourteenth Amendment authority. 
In a 1966 case, the Court interpreted Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to be an affirmative grant of power authorizing Con-
gress “to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what leg-
islation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”84  More recently, however, the Court indicated that it 
has a sole discretion to interpret the Constitution, turning back a 
congressional effort to safeguard free exercise rights beyond those 
that the justices had previously identified.85 
 
 84 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
 85 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (“Legislation which alters the meaning 
of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.”). 
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City of Boerne v. Flores began a trend of increased judicial intrusion 
into legislative policymaking.  That case found that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act to be unconstitutional because it was “so 
out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it 
[could not] be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.”86  The Court unquestioningly retained 
the state action requirement from the Civil Rights Cases, finding that 
the Fourteenth Amendment only allowed Congress to prevent state 
infringements but not to define what rights are constitutionally cog-
nizable.87  Congress, the Court asserted, lacks the mandate “to decree 
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the 
States.”88 
United States v. Morrison further diminished legislative authority to 
identify fundamental rights and to pass laws protecting them.  As with 
the Commerce Clause portion of that opinion,89 the Court held that 
the VAWA provision creating a private cause of action was beyond the 
pale of Congress’s Section 5 authority.90  Morrison also endorsed the 
state action requirement, providing further proof of the doctrine’s 
resilience.91 
The Thirteenth Amendment has no state action requirement, 
providing Congress with the power to enact legislation against private 
discrimination that is currently outside the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.92  The most effective Thirteenth Amendment statutes 
currently available primarily regulate incidents and badges of invol-
untary servitude that violate contractual and property ownership in-
terests.93  But much more can be done.  Congress has not nearly ex-
hausted its authority to pass “effective legislation” that is rationally 
related to the Amendment’s purposes.94  The Thirteenth Amendment 
 
 86 Id. at 532. 
 87 Id. at 524–25, 536. 
 88 Id. at 519. 
 89 See supra 62–66 and accompanying notes. 
 90 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
 91 Id. at 621–23.  The majority asserted that it would continue to follow “the time-honored 
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action.”  
Id. at 621. 
 92 See U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment extends 
beyond state action . . . .”). 
 93 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2000) (discussing enforcement of contracts and security of 
property). 
 94 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (“Congress has the power un-
der the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the in-
cidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legisla-
tion.”). 
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was not merely ratified for slaves to leave plantations but to allow per-
sons to meaningfully enjoy their liberties.  As Representative James 
Garfield put it the year the Amendment was ratified, if freedom 
meant no more than being unchained, it was but “a bitter mockery” 
and “a cruel delusion.”95 
Identifying what rights the Thirteenth Amendment protects be-
gins, as it does with substantive due process, with an assessment of 
what liberties are deeply rooted in the American tradition.96  But un-
like the Court’s new Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, the text of the 
Thirteenth Amendment leaves it to the legislature, not the judiciary, 
to make this initial finding.  Working through their representatives, 
the electorate can play a central role in assessing what forms of persis-
tent subordination are logically tied to the incidents of involuntary 
servitude.  Congress can then find the best means of dealing with 
those abridgements of liberty on a federal level, creating a unified 
scheme that would be binding on individuals and the States.97 
The current Thirteenth Amendment case law has remained a 
broad grant of congressional power at a time when the Court has di-
minished Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 authority.  Laurence H. 
Tribe has understood the current precedents to recognize that: 
Congress possesses an almost unlimited power to protect individual 
rights under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Seemingly, Congress is free, 
within the broad limits of reason, to recognize whatever rights it wishes, 
define the infringement of those rights as a form of domination or sub-
ordination and thus an aspect of slavery, and proscribe such infringe-
ment as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.98 
Tribe’s understanding is profound, but it needs some qualification to 
prevent the legislature from overreaching Section 2’s grant of author-
ity.  Courts can assess whether a particular statute fits within the Thir-
teenth Amendment framework by evaluating whether legislators 
came to a reasonable decision after making a normative and histori-
cal evaluation. 
The use of historical antecedents to legislative power can help 
prevent ad hoc lawmaking.  What’s more, a Thirteenth Amendment 
 
 95 James A. Garfield, Oration Delivered at Ravenna, Ohio (July 4, 1865), in 1 THE WORKS OF 
JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 86 (Burke A. Hinsdale ed., 1882). 
 96 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–22 (1997). 
 97 The Supreme Court has found that some forms of public service, such as mandatory jury 
duty or obligatory military service, do not resemble involuntary servitude when they are 
done for the common good.  See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589–90 n.11 
(1973) (asserting that compensation of “$1-a-day” for jury duty does not amount to invol-
untary servitude); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (discussing a mili-
tary draft). 
 98 1 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5–15, at 926–27 (3d ed. 2000). 
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approach can explain some of the ambiguities of Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  While the Thirteenth Amendment can 
fill some gaps in constitutional interpretation, relying on it alone can 
have its own shortcomings. 
One of the greatest challenges in the years to come will be to de-
termine the extent that the Thirteenth Amendment applies to classi-
fications other than race.  Current case law on Section 2 authority 
deals with racial discrimination.99  The temptation, in keeping with 
Tribe’s suggestion, is to claim that Congress should be left unim-
peded in its evaluation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s scope.  After 
all, the narrowing parameters of congressional power that Boerne and 
Morrison established for Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
inapplicable to the Thirteenth Amendment.  This approach is ap-
pealing because, if successful, it might prevent judicial intrusion into 
legislative policymaking.  But it is too great a leap.  A better strategy 
for expanding the Amendment’s reach is to proceed incrementally.  
Moving gradually is more likely to meet with success than seeking 
immediate judicial interpretation of the full scope of Section 2 au-
thority. 
Initial lobbying efforts should focus on statutory formulation that 
is clearly linked to overt incidents of involuntary servitude.  Existing 
laws provide a sense of what is possible.  Section 1981 covers viola-
tions of employment contracts, but it does so from a transactional 
angle.100  The law is applicable if a civil rights violation is linked to 
some form of transactional violation.  For instance, it provides a pri-
vate cause of action against labor exploitation.  A person who is lured 
to the United States by an employer promising a position at a restau-
rant but is then forced into sexual slavery can sue under § 1981.  If 
the victim could not pursue a contractual claim, she might sue under 
the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 
(“TVPA”), another statute grounded in Thirteenth Amendment en-
forcement authority.101  There is no comparable private cause of ac-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
If the lawsuit were only seeking redress for gender violence in the 
workplace, with no involvement of coerced labor, neither § 1981 nor 
 
 99 See, e.g., Jones, 392 U.S. at 442–43 (“And when racial discrimination herds men into ghet-
tos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a 
relic of slavery.”); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (discussing schools’ ra-
cially-discriminatory admissions policies). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
101 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2006) (“Trafficking Victims Protection”); Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466 (2000); see 
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1594 (2006) (dealing with forced labor). 
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the TVPA would be implicated.  To fill this gap, Congress could cre-
ate a private cause of action for gender motivated violence that is 
perpetrated during the course of employment.  That type of statute 
would begin to fill the private cause of action gap left open when the 
Supreme Court found the Violence Against Women Act to be uncon-
stitutional.  It would carry the Thirteenth Amendment a step beyond 
the racial context but still retain its readily recognizable connection 
to civil rights violations that occur in the workplace. 
Given the close relation of workplace violence to slavery and in-
voluntary servitude, a court would likely find the statute to be a con-
stitutionally legitimate use of Section 2 authority.  To further bolster 
such a statute, Congress should pass it pursuant to both its Thirteenth 
Amendment and Commerce Clause power.  A severability provision, 
allowing the statute to survive even if one of those bases of power 
were to be found unconstitutional, would further bolster it against 
constitutional challenges. 
Outside the gender context, incremental steps can also be taken 
to protect groups who are not members of a suspect class.  An even 
more cautious approach is warranted here since it is an additional 
step beyond the currently race-focused interpretation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. 
Most members of Congress already support efforts to rely on the 
Thirteenth Amendment to add sexual orientation among the charac-
teristics protected by national hate crime laws.102  Sexual orientation 
discrimination is the third most common form of hate crime.103  The 
number of such crimes is only exceeded by racially and religiously 
motivated hate crimes.104  Yet, the current federal hate crime law does 
not penalize offenses motivated by sexual orientation bias.105  The 
most recent attempt at preventing harms to the safety of gays, lesbi-
ans, and other at-risk groups, the Matthew Shepard Bill, relied on 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.106  When the bill failed to 
get adequate congressional support, Senator Edward Kennedy who 
sponsored the effort, withdrew it from consideration. 
 
102 My characterization of the congressional level of support for the hate crime bill is based 
on conversations with a congressional staffer on Senator Richard Durbin’s staff on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. 
103 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006 Hate Crime Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/
ucr/hc2006/victims.html (last visited May 8, 2009). 
104 Id. 
105 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (2006) (providing for criminal penalties for violence motivated by 
race, color, religion, or national origin). 
106 See supra note 78--79 and accompanying text. 
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Kennedy’s proposed bill would have made it a criminal offense to 
commit violent acts “motivated by prejudice based on the actual or 
perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orien-
tation, gender identity, or disability of the victim, or is a violation of 
the State, local, or Tribal hate crime laws.”107  Adding protections for 
vulnerable peoples not covered under current law would allow Con-
gress to combat subordinating behavior analogous to the incidents of 
involuntary servitude.  Hence, Kennedy invoked Thirteenth Amend-
ment Section 2 authority.  The bill would have been less vulnerable to 
opposition had it been approached more pragmatically, although the 
down side of this approach is a diminished sense of idealism. 
A more incremental approach to a hate crime statute that adds a 
sexual orientation component would prevent subordinating violence 
in the workplace.108  If this narrow act were to pass judicial scrutiny, 
then Congress could seek to broaden the reach of its Section 2 au-
thority to areas unconnected to labor. 
Take, for example, the right to privacy, which the court has found 
to be a protected substantive due process interest.  Under the current 
state action doctrine, Congress cannot use its Section 5 power to 
promulgate a statute prohibiting individuals from infringing on indi-
viduals’ privacy interests.  The Court is limited by institutional con-
straints to adjudicating ripe claims about allegedly offending state 
regulations. Where no state regulation of constitutionally protected 
private conduct, like homosexual intimacy,109 is involved, litigants 
cannot obtain legal redress.  Consequently, gay Boy Scout leaders 
who seek an injunction or damages against that organization have no 
recourse under the Fourteenth Amendment.110 
From a historic perspective, being excluded from organizations 
was a feature of slavery.  Before the Civil War, blacks were commonly 
prohibited from congregating to pray, play at cards, roll dice, attend 
cultural activities, and participate in fraternal orders.111  Likewise, 
most trade associations from the eighteenth to the early twentieth 
 
107 Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 
110th Cong. § 4(a)(1)(C) (2007). 
108 One of the bill’s weaknesses was the failure to clearly link sexual orientation-motivated 
crimes to the incidents of involuntary servitude. 
109 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–79 (2003). 
110 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643–44 (2000) (holding that a New Jersey 
anti-discrimination statute was inapplicable to an organization that had the associational 
right to include persons based on sexual orientation). 
111 DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, GABRIEL’S REBELLION:  THE VIRGINIA SLAVE CONSPIRACIES OF 1800 
AND 1802, at 30 (1993); WHITTINGTON B. JOHNSON, BLACK SAVANNAH 1788–1864, at 23 
(1996). 
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centuries often prohibited women from joining.112  Contemporary 
cases of slavery perpetrated by sweatshops also infringe on workers’ 
right to associate in trade unions.113  Exclusion from organizations has 
been intrinsic to slavery and involuntary servitude from the colonial 
period to the present.  Legislators could, therefore, rationally con-
clude that Section 2 allows Congress to prohibit exclusion from asso-
ciations, at least in cases where some labor is involved, as with Boy 
Scout leaders.  Just as segregated school associational rights do not 
trump those of parents wishing to enroll their children,114 the associa-
tional rights of a discriminatory organization cannot trump the inter-
est of unobtrusive individuals seeking to participate in them. 
The ability of qualified persons to join organizations of their 
choice, without being subject to arbitrary character tests, also enables 
them to exercise other rights.  For example, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized that the “firmly established”115 “freedom of tra-
vel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech 
and association.”116  Decisions dealing with that right to move about 
have, to date, relied on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the 
Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Commerce 
Clause.117 
Justice Douglas asserted that the right to travel internationally is “a 
part of our heritage,” which is protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.118  In Kent v. Dulles, he explained how it was 
connected to other human functions:  “Travel abroad, like travel 
within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood.  It may be as 
close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or 
wears, or reads.  Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of val-
ues.”119  In fact, in antebellum United States the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment applied to travel into territories and the Dis-
 
112 See, e.g., ELIZABETH BLACKMAR, MANHATTAN FOR RENT, 1785–1850, at 54 (1989). 
113 See ROBERT J. S. ROSS, SLAVES TO FASHION:  POVERTY AND ABUSE IN THE NEW SWEATSHOPS 
268–69 (2004). 
114 Runyon v, McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176–77 (1976). 
115 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). 
116 Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 517 (1964). 
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trict of Columbia.120  But slaves and even free blacks were routinely 
prohibited from exercising that liberty by States or slaveholders.121  
The Fourteenth Amendment incorporated due process rights against 
state barriers but not against private interference with travel. 
Another Warren Court case, which found a welfare residency re-
quirement to be unconstitutional, held that absent a compelling state 
reason state interference with the right to travel was an equal protec-
tion violation.122  Three decades later a Rehnquist Court welfare rights 
case determined that an excessive burden on out-of-state plaintiffs’ 
right to travel violated their privileges and immunities as “Citizens in 
the several States.”123 
A decision that pursued a different analysis found that “the consti-
tutional right of interstate travel” is secure against governmental and 
private interference.124  The right to travel on highways “and other in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a posi-
tion fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”125  The prob-
lem with this Commerce Clause tract is that standing alone, without 
an added Thirteenth Amendment rationale, it rests a fundamental 
right on the basis of substantial economic factors.  On the other 
hand, the Fourteenth Amendment alone is useless against private 
conspiracies to interfere with travel, since the Court remains con-
vinced that Amendment is only applicable to state infringements. 
The Thirteenth Amendment, on the other hand, provides a his-
torically supported reason to believe that arbitrary interference with 
the right to travel is an incident of involuntary servitude.  Masters 
prevented their human chattel from leaving at will.126  Upon gaining 
their freedom through the Amendment, many newly freed persons 
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travelled to find work, seek long-displaced relatives, or take a vaca-
tion.127 
In 1866, Senator Lyman Trumbull, who was chairman of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee that fashioned the text of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, explained the right to travel within the context of Sec-
tion 2 enforcement authority: 
 It is idle to say that a man is free who cannot go and come at pleas-
ure . . . [and] who cannot enforce his rights.  These are rights which the 
first clause of the constitutional amendment meant to secure to all; 
and . . . [so] that Congress would not have the power to secure them the 
second section of the amendment was added.128 
One of the great failures of the Reconstruction Congresses was their 
inability to successfully prevent legal and private restrictions, through 
legal devices like vagrancy laws and plantation owners’ pacts, on free-
persons’ travels.129 
The Court’s most explicit statement on the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s applicability to free movement cases came in Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge.130  The case dealt with a portion of the Ku Klux Klan Act that 
criminalized private conspiracies that intended to deprive persons 
from using the interstate highway system.131  The majority recognized 
that penalizing conspirators who use a public highway to deprive 
their victims of the “equal protection of the laws, or of equal privi-
leges and immunities under the laws” invoked Fourteenth Amend-
ment language.132  The Thirteenth Amendment, on the other hand, 
explicitly did not include an equal protection clause.133  To find a way 
around the state action requirement, without overturning the Civil 
Rights Cases, the Court asserted that “[o]ur cases have firmly estab-
lished that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected, 
does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is as-
sertable against private as well as governmental interference.”134  The 
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Thirteenth Amendment offered the necessary resolution since it pro-
vided Congress with the power to prevent “racially discriminatory pri-
vate action.”135  In later years, the Court explained that “the conspir-
acy at issue [in Griffin] was actionable because it was aimed at 
depriving the plaintiffs of rights protected by the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the right to travel guaranteed by the Federal Consti-
tution.”136 
Griffin has broad implications.  First, Congress can reasonably de-
termine what restrictions on travel, whether private or public, are the 
badges and incidents of involuntary servitude.  Then it can provide 
penalties to prevent them.  Arbitrary barriers to choosing a home, for 
instance, significantly hinder movement.  This means that a federal 
housing law might be advanced through the Thirteenth Amendment.  
Such a statute might prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, which the current law does not cover.137  Such a fair hous-
ing law could also be even more far reaching than the current model, 
which only applies to dwellings that benefit from federal funding.138  
The Thirteenth Amendment, I believe, provides the authority to en-
act a civil rights statute, even when the offending residence receives 
no governmental spending. 
Legislative developments in this constitutional niche might also 
offer federal protections against criminal profiling, hate crimes, and 
U.S. company exploitation of foreign workers.  While these achieve-
ments will take time, they may be feasible in the future:  criminal pro-
filing—which is usually based on race, national origin, and ethnic-
ity—prevents targeted persons from travelling freely through 
neighborhoods.  Hate crimes similarly intimidate persons from exer-
cising their right of free movement.  And domestic companies that 
exploit overseas sweatshop labor operate from the United States to 
perpetuate slavery. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Thirteenth Amendment not only ended slavery, through its 
First Section, but also allowed Congress to secure liberties against 
continued forms of arbitrary subordination through Section 2.  The 
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Amendment’s broad language enables each generation, through 
their elected representatives, to abolish coercive practices.  Its focus, 
unlike the Commerce Clause, does not trigger economic concerns, 
and, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, lacks wording that can be 
mistaken for a state action requirement. 
The Rehnquist Court placed new restraints on congressional 
Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment authority, but it left 
intact broad legislative power to identify and regulate the badges and 
incidents of involuntary servitude.  Congress may pass necessary and 
proper laws that it reasonably expects will end any subordinating in-
fringements against individual rights.  Legislation should be passed 
with enough circumspection to provide protections for fundamental 
interests like associational liberties and free movement.  Success is 
more likely if the efforts are incremental, focusing initial legislative 
proposals on ending civil rights discrimination related to work envi-
ronments and infringements on core interests, like free movement.  
This approach can best avoid eliciting judicial decisions that under-
mine the sort of deference shown in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer. 
If this initial effort succeeds, Congress can eventually become 
more expansive in its policies.  The Thirteenth Amendment’s ulti-
mate commitment is to ending any arbitrary impediments on funda-
mental liberties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
